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HISTORY OF KENTUCKY COMMERCIAL MOTOR
VEHICLE TRANSPORTATION TAX LEGISLATION
By RAY H. G.ARRISON' and JAMES W. MALkRTIN**
I
Legislation for the registration of motor vehicles in the
United States developed slowly. In 1901 New York became the
first state to provide for motor vehicle registration. After 1902
state legislatures everywhere began to enact registration laws.
First laws were passed in 1903 in seven states. In 1904 four
others were added. Other states rapidly fell in line: 12 in 1905,
the banner year for original motor license legislation; 2 in
1906; 3 and the District of Columbia in 1907; 1 in 1909; and 2
in 1910.2 It is significant that of the New England, Aliddle At-
lantic, North Central, and Pacific Coast states the only ones
which had not passed motor registration statutes before 1911
were New Hampshire and North Dakota.
:" Mr. Garrison, Supervisor of Escheats, Kentucky Department
of Revenue, and formerly research assistant, Bureau of Business Re-
search, University of Kentucky, did the detailed research incident to
preparation of a report on which most of the material presented
here was based.
.'* Mr. Martin, Director of the University of Kentucky Bureau
of Business Research, supervised Mr. Garrison's work on the larger
research project and prepared the text of this paper largely on the
basis of the earlier study. The authors are grateful for criticism of
this manuscript by Messrs. Guy A. Huguelet, President, Southeastern
Greyhound Lines; J. H. McChord, Louisville and Nashville Railroad
Co.; and representatives of the Kentucky Motor Truck Club.
Unless otherwise noted, this historical sketch is based on the
session laws of the various states and the annual digest of state
motor laws by the National Highway Users Conference, formerly the
Motor Vehicle Conference Committee.
'James W. Martin, The Motor Vehicle Registration License
(1927) 12 BULL. NAT. TAX ASS'N 193, 196.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
EARLY LEGISLATION PROVIDING MHOTOR REGISTRATION
Passage of these laws did not signify the use of the motor
license as a tax measure. The small flat-rate fee for a permanent
license indicated it was for police purposes. After 1910, how-
ever, some of the original laws, as they were passed in those
states which had previously failed to enact such legislation, be-
gan clearly to show that state legislatures were becoming aware
of the possibility that motor registration could be made a lu-
crative source of revenue. The increase in flat fees and the
change to annual registration evidenced the trend toward em-
phasis on revenue.
Three states enacted their first laws in 1911 levying flat-
rate, permanent registration fees; and Florida provided for
graduation from $5.00 to $10 on the basis of horsepower. In
1912 Arizona and Mississippi provided graduation in rates on
the basis of horsepower. Five western states enacted their
original registration laws in 1913 with graduation of rates based
on horsepower. Wyoming was the only state to enact a flat an-
nual fee in 1913. Louisiana, the only remaining state to enact
motor registration, in 1914 provided for a fee of $0.25 per
horsepower with $5.00 as the minimum charge.3 By 1914 all
states and the District of Columbia had enacted motor registra-
tion rates4 predicated on different bases, but only 11 states5
made any* special provision for motor trucks. The remainder
applied to motor trucks the same schedule of rates paid for
passenger cars. Most of the states charged either flat rates or
rates based on horsepower.6
The states which placed motor trucks in a separate class
and exacted fees different from those assessed against pas-
senger cars did so in accordance with two directly conflicting
theories. Some states deliberately put motor trucks into a sep-
arate class and charged flat fees, which in several instances
were less than the regular rates applicable to passenger cars of
similar horsepower. This marked deviation in favor of the motor
truck owners can be explained: (a) The motor truck was held
to be useful and, therefore, should be relieved of any inordinate
'Id. at 195.
'Motor Vehicle Taxes (May, 1938) 1 TAx ADMINISTRATORS
NEWS 4.
Conn., Ind., Me., Md., Mass., N. H., N. J., N. Y., Ore., Pa., R. I.
I See Table I.
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burden; and (b) the effect of the motor truck upon the service
life of the highways was not considered as a factor in heavier
taxation of trucks, as their use was still rather limited. The
TABLE I. METHODS OF LICENSING PRIVATE MOTOR
TRUCKS BY THE VARIOUS STATES
Basis of license tax Number of states
190S 1912 1914 1921 1923 1924 1927 1931 1942
I. One measure:
Flat rate per vehicle 27 22 25 2 - 1 1 1 -
Horsepower 3 14 17 2 2 - 1
Capacity 2 25 25 25 23 19 13
Gross weight 1 7 12 10 11 S 14
Net weight 2 - 2 4 5 10
Chassis weight 1 1 1 3 -
Value 1 - - I
Tire width . 1 1 1 1
Live load capacity- - -- -- -- --
II. Two measures:
Horsepower, flat fee
Horsepower, gross weight -
Horsepower, net weight
Horsepower, capacity
Net weight, capacity -
Value, gross weight -
Value, capacity
Net weight, flat fee -
Flat fee, capacity
Gross weight, capacity -
Gross weight, wheels -
Horsepower, wheels
Chassis weight, capacity
Gross weight, flat fee -
Gross weight, age
Chassis weight, age
Chassis weight, axles
Net weight, age
III. Three measures:
Net weight, value, horse-
power
Net weight, horsepower,
capacity
Net weight, capacity, flat fee -
Net weight, axles, flat fee
IV. Four measures:
Net weight, horsepower,
value, capacity
- - - - 1
- - - - 1
1 -
-- 2
- - I - I
Total states 30 36 46 48 49 49 49 49 49
Source: Compiled from the annual digests of state motor tax laws
of the National Highway Users Conference; R. K. Tomlin, The Trend
of Motor Vehicle Legislation (1921) 87 ENGINEERING NEWS RECORD
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
354; Henry R. Trumbower, Motor Vehicle Fees and Gasoline Taxes
(1924) 5 PUBLIC ROADS 1-9; Thomas H. MacDonald, The Taxation of
Motor Vehicles in 1932 (1934) PROCEEDINGS, HIGHWAY RESEARCH
BOARD 27-29; THE TAX RESEARCH FOUNDATION, TAX SYSTEMS (1942)
236-244.
theory that motor trucks were largely engaged in intracity opera-
tions and, as a consequence, did no harm to the rural highways
may have been considered3 Other states charged a higher fee
for trucks on the ground that they were more destructive to
the roads.
The constitutionality of many of these early statutes was
challenged in the state courts, but the laws were generally
upheld as legitimate exercise of the states' police powers.S The
courts usually considered the motor vehicle, because it frighten-
ed horses, as dangerous to the ordinary travelers on the high-
way. The Massachusetts Court stated that it was "the duty
of the Legislature, in the exercise of the police power, to con-
sider the risks that arise from the use of new inventions apply-
ing the forces of nature in previously unknown ways. ' ' The
license and registration features of the laws were regarded as
aids in the administration of the regulatory acts and in the
identification of vehicles. The registration and numbering was
usually considered by the state courts as necessary for the de-
tection of law violations incident to motor vehicle use.
Thus, by 1910, after several states had changed to gradu-
ated annual fees, Kentucky enacted her first registration act.10
This original Kentucky legislation sought primarily the ade-
quate regulation of traffic and made the collection of revenue a
secondary purpose. It required brakes, bell or horn, proper
speed, and diligence toward animals on the highways.1 1  It
authorized the Secretary of State to receive the sworn applica-
tions of the vehicle owner, who was required to file within ten
days after acquisition of a vehicle, setting forth his name and
Henry R. Trumbower, Motor Vehicle Fees and Gasoline Taxes
(1924) 5 PuB. ROADS 1, 4.
8Bozeman v. State, 7 Ala. App. 151, 61 So. 604 (1913); Ayres
et al. v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 237, 87 N.E. 1073 (1909); State v.
Mayo, 106 Me. 62, 75 AtI. 295 (1909); Ruggles v. State, 120 Md. 553,
87 Atl. 1080 (1913); Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542, 85
N.E. 848 (1908); Unwen v. New Jersey, 73 N.J.L. (Sup. Ct.) 529, 64
At. 163 (1906), aff'd, 75 N.J.L. 500, 68 AtI. 110 (1907); Brazier et al.
v. Philadelphia et al., 215 Pa. 297, 64 Atl. 508 (1906).
'Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542, 85 N.E. 848 (1908).
" Martin, loc. cit. supra.
"Acts 1910, chap. 81, secs. 7-11, pp. 246-248.
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address with a brief description of his vehicle. Each application
was accompanied by the prescribed fee. 12 All revenue collected
by the Secretary of State was for the State Road Fund. Each
owner who registered was issued an aluminum seal, circular in
form and not exceeding 2 inches in diameter, with "Registered
.Motor Vehicle No. -, Ky." stamped on it.
13
Kentucky modified her registration law in 1914 by creating
the office of commissioner of motor vehicles as a branch of the
Department of State. Rates were increased slightly, for it was
anticipated that the expenditures of the Department of Public
Roads, which had been created in 1912 with an appropriation
from the license tax, would almost double. 14 Again, as in the
act of 1910, trucks and passenger cars were classified alike;
and the rates'5 were based solely on horsepower, rather than on
the character of the vehicle. This practice was the rule in the
majority of states.' 6
Although the first motor registration tax in Kentucky be-
came effective in 1910, its constitutionality was not challenged
immediately. The constitutional basis for such a measure had
been upheld earlier in connection with horse-drawn vehicles. 17
The Court of Appeals in upholding the earlier act' s permitting
municipalities to levy a tax on the use of drays running in the
streets laid the basis for the motor vehicle registration fee in
1910. The court in Bowser and Co. v. Thompson, Judge19 held
'2Acts 1910, chap. 81, sec. 2, p. 242. See Table II for major pro-
visions of each registration law.
'Acts 1910, chap. 81, sec. 3, p. 244.
"Message of Gov. James B. McCreary to the General Assembly
of Kentucky (Jan. 6, 1912) 1 Ky. SEN. J. 47.
"Acts 1914, chap. 69, sec. 2, p. 180.
" In Connecticut the basis was horsepower and the character of
the vehicle (i.e., whether truck or passanger vehicle), but in Massa-
chusetts the graduation was only on the basis of the character of the
vehicle. Delaware, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin provided for a
difference in rates on the basis of the character of the vehicle. New
Jersey graduated rates on the basis of horsepower plus a flat rate
for vehicles weighing over 4,000 lbs.
"Bowser and Co. v. Thompson, Judge, 103 Ky. 331, 45 S.W. 73
(1898).
"Acts 1893, chap. 244, sec. 225, p. 1330.
" 103 Ky. 331, 333, 45 S.W. 73 (1898). As to horse-drawn
vehicles not for hire, see Livingston and Co. v. City of Paducah, 80
Ky. 656 (1883); City of Covington v. Woods and Co., 98 Ky. 344, 33
S.W. 84 (1895). However, provisions for the payment of a fee by
those using motor vehicles on the highways are now generally held
not to be a property tax, but in the nature of a license fee, so that
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that "the use of the streets and public ways . . . is a use common
to all, . . . but this use must not be exercised by any to the injury
of others; . . . and when in the nature of things, it will likely
be so exercised, regulations may be imposed under the police
power." Thus, the constitutional right of Kentucky to license
vehicles on the public highways was established in 1898 even
prior to the enactment of the first law licensing motor vehicles.
After the registration tax had been in effect in Kentucky
for seven years, a motorist challenged the validity of the 1914
act on the ground that the amount exacted under the police
power exceeded the cost of registration and supervision; that
it was contrary to the articles of the Kentucky Constitution
pertaining to uniform taxation; and that it disregarded the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 Furthermore,
the plaintiff insisted that the statute as a whole violated the
Kentucky Constitution because it related to two subjects, 21 while
only one was expressed in the title. ie presented evidence to
show that the cost of registering a motor vehicle, including the
numbered tags and the maintenance of the commissioner's of-
fice, was less than $1.00 per vehicle; that the cost of registra-
tion of a vehicle of 20 horsepower was no more than the cost
for a vehicle of 50 horsepower; but that the registration rates
varied from $6.00 to $20.
These charges were made even though the United States
Supreme Court in 1915 had upheld a Maryland statute which
prescribed a comprehensive licensing scheme graduated accord-
ing to horsepower. 22  The Supreme Court had also upheld a
New Jersey statute in 1916 with fees based on horsepower. 23 In
constitutional provisions governing ad valorem property taxes no
longer affect the imposition of such fees. See Kane v. State of New
Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30 (1916).
'Smith v. Commonwealth for use, et al., 175 Ky. 286, 194 S.W.
367 (1917).
' Section 51 of the Constitution states, "No law enacted by the
general assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall
be expressed in the title ..
"Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 Sup. Ct. 140
(1915).
"Kane v. State of New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30
(1916), see also Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35
Sup. Ct. 140 (1915); Bozeman v. State, 7 Ala. App. 151, 61 So. 604
(1913); Jackson, Sheriff v. Neff, 64 Fla. 326, 60 So. 350 (1912); State
v. Ingalls, 18 N. Mex. 285, 135 Pac. 1177 (1913).
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TABLE IH. RATE PROVISIONS IN COMMERCIAL MOTOR TAX
LAWS IN KENTUCKY, 1910-1938
Date Truck Bus
11910 Base: horsepower
1-24
25-49
50 and up
1914 Base: horsepower
1-24
25-49
50 and up
1915 Base: capacity
looO or less lbs.
1001-2o00 lbs.
20o1-3000 lbs.
3001-4000 lbs.
4001-5000 lbs.
5001-6000 lbs.
600o-7000 lbs.
7001-S010 lbs.
S001-9000 lbs.
9001-10001) lbs.
Each ton additional
1920 Base: capacity
IWoo or less lbs.
100l1-2000 lbs.
20o1-3000 lbs.
3101-40100 lbs.
41o01-5mO lbs.
5001-6i00 lbs.
601-7100 lbs.
7001-861iI0 lbs.
S1101-9000 lbs.
91001-10000 lbs.
Each ton additional
1924 Base: capacity
100" or less lbs.
1001-2000 lbs.
2ool-3o00 lbs.
3001-400 lbs.
4001-500o lbs.
5001-6000 lbs.
61101-7000 lbs.
7001-8000 lbs.
sO01--9Oot lbs.
'6111-10000 lbs.
Each additional ton
1926 Base: capacity
Up to 9000 lbs. same as
1924.
91i01-1I111i0 lbs.
Over 10000 lbs.
Each additional ton
Same as for trucks
Same as for trucks
Same as passenger cars
or
Base: horsepower
1-24
25-49
50 and up
Same as truck rates
1922 truck registration rates plus
the following special charge per
seat if vehicle is on a regular route:
5 seats or less $ 2.50 per seat
6-8 seats 5.00 per seat
8-20 seats 10.00 per seat
20 seats and up 15.00 per seat
Not on regular route:
Base vehicle weight $0.40 per 100
lbs. of vehicle weight plus $0.19 per
horsepower, plus $1.50 per seat.
10 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
TABLE I. (Continued)
Date Truck Bus
On regular route:
Base vehicle weight and tag-seat
tax
$1 per 100 lbs. of vehicle weight
plus $5 per seat for 5 seats or less
and $10 for tag; $10 per seat for 6
to 20 seats and $25 for tag; $15 per
seat for 21 to 30 seats and $50 for
tag.
1930 Same as 1926
1932 Registration rates same as
for 1930.
Special carrier tax:
Excise tax rate per mile
traveled based on vehicle
weight: 5500-6000 lbs., $0.005;
above 6000 lbs., another
$0.005 per mile added for
each additional ton.
1934 Base: capacity
1000 or less lbs.
1001-2000 lbs.
2001-3000 lbs.
3001-4000 lbs.
4001-5000 lbs.
5001-6000 lbs.
6001-7000 lbs.
7001-8000 lbs.
8001-9000 lbs.
9001-10000 lbs.
Over 10000 lbs.
Each additional ton
above 10000 lbs.
Rates same as 1926, except rate per
100 lbs. of vehicle weight was re-
duced to $0.50.
On regular route:
$0.50 per 100 lbs. vehicle weight,
plus: (1) 1-7 seats, $10 tag; (2)
8-16 seats, $10 tag; (3) 17-25 seats,
$25 tag; (4) 26 seats and up, $50
tag. In addition, a seat-mileage
tax as follows: (1) 1-7 seats, $3
per seat plus $0.0025 per mile
traveled; (2) 8-16 seats, $7.50 per
seat plus $0.0075 per mile traveled;
(3) 17-25 seats, $10 per seat plus
$0.0075 per mile traveled; (4) 26-29
seats, $12.50 per seat plus $0.01 per
mile trave:ed; (5) 30 seats and up,
$15 per seat plus $0.03 per mile
traveled.
Not on regular route:
Same as 1926
$0.50 per 100 lbs. vehicle weight
and in addition:
Plate tax:
1-7 passengers $10.00 per bus
8-17 passengers 10.00 per bus
18-25 passengers 17.50 per bus
26-29 passengers 32.50 per bus
30 or more passengers 50.00 per bus
Seat-mileage carrier tax:
1-7 passengers, $2.00 per seat plus
$0.0025 per mi.; 8-17 passengers,
$5.00 per seat plus $0.005 per mi.;
18-25 passengers, $7.00 per seat
plus $0.0075 per mi.; 26-29 pas-
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TABLE II. (Continued)
Date Truck Bus
Special carrier tax: sengers, $8.50 per seat plus $0.01
Excise tax rate per mile per mi.; 30 or more passengers, $10
traveled based on vehicle per seat plus $0.03 per mi.
weight: less than 5000 lbs.,
$u.0025; 5000-6000 lbs., $0.005;
above 6000 lbs., another
$11.005 per mi:e added for
each additional ton.
193S Registration fees same as
1934.
Intercity busses:
Special carrier fees: Tag tax, $8.00 per seat for first 16;
$15 per seat for next 8; and $25 for
Weight (excise) tax, $1 per each remaining seat. In addition,
1lTh lbs. net weight. a special mileage fee, 1/36th of a
cent per regular seat multiplied by
total miles trave:ed.
City busses:
$1.50 per regular seat.
Source: Compiled from Acts 1910-1938.
the Hetndrick and Kane cases the Supreme Court upheld the
registration taxes there imposed not only on the theory that
they reimbursed the state for special administrative expenses,
but also on the theory that they compensated the state for the
utse of the highways. Justice McReynolds said in the Hendrick
opinion:
"In view of the many decisions of this court there can be no
serious doubt that where a state at its own expense furnished
special facilities for the use of those engaged in commerce, inter-
state as well as domestic, it may exact compensation therefor."
Following the precedents established by other courts, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals upheld the power of the General As-
sembly to levy a graduated motor vehicle license fee applying
to both residents and nonresidents on the compensatory use
principle.
The plenary right of the states, except to the extent that
they have transferred such power to municipalities, to regulate
and control their streets under the police power involved no
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new or unusual principles, but simply the application of doc-
trines that had long been uniformly recognized and thoroughly
crystallized by the United States Supreme Court.24 Kentucky
motorists generally accepted this long-recognized right inherent
in the sovereignty of the state as cited in the decision of 189825
in regard to horse-drawn vehicles and applied it to motor ve-
hicles.
The General Assembly may by general law delegate to the
governing body of municipalities the power to impose a license
tax in addition to the license fee charged by the state,
6 and has
done so. 27 Such authority may be delegated under either the
police power or the taxing power. 28 However, in the absence of
any constitutional provision governing the subject, the power
of a municipality to regulate the use of its streets by licensing
exists only as delegated to it by the General Assembly; and the
authority may be withdrawn at any time.
29
-Phillips v. City of Mobile, 208 U. S. 472, 28 Sup. Ct. 370 (1908);
Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 17 Sup. Ct. 282 (1897); Robbins v.
Shelby Co. Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592 (1887);
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357 (1885).
'Bowser and Co. v. Thompson, Judge, 103 Ky. 331, 45 S.W. 73
(1898).
'Ky. Const., sec. 181.
'Acts 1893, chap. 244, sec. 225, p. 1330; Acts 1906, chap. 57,
sec. 5, p. 310.
'Panke v. City of Louisville et al., 229 Ky. 186, 16 S.W. (2d)
1034 (1929); City of Mayfield v. Carter Hardware Co., 192 Ky. 381,
233 S.W. 789 (1921); City of Mayfield v. Carter Hardware Co., 191
Ky. 364, 230 S.W. 298 (1921); City of Henderson v. Lockett et al., 157
Ky. 366, 163 S.W. 199 (1914); Bowser and Co. v. Thompson, Judge,
103 Ky. 331, 45 S.W. 73 (1898).
9 City of Newport v. Merkel Bros. Co., 156 Ky. 580, 161 S.W. 549
(1913). Motor transportation license laws are generally valid as a
proper exercise of the police power of the state or municipality. If a
license or registration tax is imposed upon motor vehicles as a
regulation for a specific and burdensome use of the public highways,
it is a valid exercise of the police power. Thus, although the amount
of the fee exceeds the expense of administering the act and the
supervising of vehicle operation, the regulation is not invalid as an
attempt to raise revenue under the guise of a police regulation. The
fact that a statute is both a regulatory and to some extent a revenue
measure, as raising funds for road construction and maintenance,
does not affect its validity. An ordinary motor vehicle license, how-
ever, is not a license to do business as a common carrier transporta-
tion company. The former is a license or tax on the privilege of
operating the vehicle on the highways; the latter is not only a tax
on the privilege of using the highways, but also on the business of the
person or company operating the motor vehicles. [Cf. State ex rel.
Transportation Ass'n of Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, Secretary of State,
181 Wis. 552, 196 N.W. 848 (1914).]
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REGISTRATION AS A REVENUE SOURCE
During World War I and the postwar era, a greater de-
nand for revenue was felt in many states.30 New bases of grad-
uation developed in the various states including net weight, 31
carrying capacity,32 net weight and the number of registra-
tions, 33 and gross weight. 34 These new bases indicated that an
effort was being made to find a more accurate measure of the
benefit to the highway users.
As the use of motor vehicles grew in Kentucky, the de-
mand for improved highways and for the payment of the bill
by motor vehicle owners increased. 35 The General Assembly
boosted the rates in 1918 and also for the first time provided
a separate rate schedule for commercial truck licenses based on
carrying capacity, but it fixed no standard for determining load
capacity.33 In the absence of any legislatively prescribed stand-
ard, officials charged with the administration of the registration
tax adopted manufacturers' ratings as a standard. The new
classification plan adopted by Kentucky in 1918 not only in-
creased the amount of revenue, 37 but also provided a more
equitable base for taxation. 38  Although engineering details
were not available for accurate cost distribution, the legislature
realized that graduation should be in proportion to wear and
tear on the roads.
The new rate on a 4-ton truck was more than double the
tax on a 2-ton truck, and the tax on a 5-ton truck was made
triple the tax on a 2-ton truck. This was probably equitable
inasmuch as the rates should increase more rapidly than the
increase in carrying capacity if the distribution of the total ta.x
load on the motorists is to approximate comparative destrue-
''Martin, op. cit. supra 199.
"' Georgia for trucks.
"Conn., Fla., Mass., Miss., Mont., N. Y., Ore., and Wash. for
trucks.
Idaho for trucks.
'N. J., Pa., and Del. for trucks.
See Courier-Journal, Jan. 9, 1918, p. 2, c. 4. Support of this
movement was given by Gov. A. 0. Stanley, the Department of Public
Roads, and the county road engineers of Kentucky.
', Acts 1918, chap. 27, sec. 1, p. 83.
C f. 1 EFFICIENCY COMMISSION OF KENTUCKY, THE GOVERNM\[ENT
OF KENTUCKY (1924) 298.
"Cf. the criticism of horsepower as a base in Harry A. Barth,
State Taxation of Passenger Automobiles (1924) 13 NATIONAL MUNIC-
IPAL REVIEW 641, 643.
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tiveness of their vehicles on the highways, 39 because the gasoline
tax in general increases less rapidly, as the size of the vehicle
becomes greater, than does relative wear and tear on the high-
ways. The minimum rate for a truck was $11 as compared with
a minimum of $6.00 on a passenger vehicle of equal weight. The
State Tax Commission interpreted "passenger cars" to include
busses.
In 1920 the General Assembly passed legislation which ap-
plied to busses the same schedule of rates as prescribed for
trucks. In addition the 1918 rates were approximately doubled
for each class of commercial vehicles.4 0 Rates varied from $22
on vehicles with a capacity of 1,000 pounds or less to $150, plus
$50 for each additional ton for vehicles the capacity of which
exceeded 10,000 pounds. The rates were slightly progressive, so
that the total license tax on a 2.5-ton truck was $70 and that on
a 5-ton truck was $150. Yet with these new rates in effect suf-
ficient revenue for execution of the new road law was lacking.
41
Kentucky needed much added revenue because she had largely
broken away from her previous haphazard methods of local
financing, placed road building on a business basis, and fixed
responsibility on one organization 42 staffed with trained engi-
neers.
Capacity, as provided in Kentucky by this act, was the
prevailing measure of the tax in other states. Twenty-four
states in addition to Kentucky employed capacity as a measure,
and the remaining states employed 12 different methods of
charging license fees for trucks.43 By 1924 many modifications
were made in these methods, all of which were intended to give
the states revenue in proportion to the trucks' use of the high-
ways.
In 1924 the registration rates on trucks and busses with a
capacity greater than 2,000 pounds were raised substantially.
44
For example, the rate for a 5-ton truck was increased from $150
'James W. Martin, License Fee Properly Supplements Gasoline
Tax (1927) ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD 722. Cf. EFFICIENCY COM-
MISSION OF KENTUCKY, loc. cit. supra.
'Acts 1920, chap. 90, sec. 2, p. 418.
41 JOE S. BOGGS, PLANS AND POLICIES OF THE STATE HIGHWAY COM-
MISSION (1920) 6.
Acts 1920, chap. 17, pp. 76 if.
"See Table I.
Acts 1924, chap. 79, sec. 1, p. 201.
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to $215. This increase resulted from a policy of requiring trucks
to pay taxes more nearly proportional to road destructiveness.
In 1926 the registration rates for trucks were again raised
in the upper brackets, so that rates varied from $20 to $300.:1
The registration rate for motor busses operating on regular
routes was made $1.00 per 100 pounds gross vehicle weight.
4
.
In addition a tag tax graduated on the basis of seating capacity
was provided. Passenger carriers for hire but not operating over
a regular route were taxed at $0.40 per 100 pounds gross ve-
hicle weight.
In order more nearly to equalize the tax on passenger car-
riers for hire operating on regular routes with that on contract
carriers, the legislature in 1930 lowered the rate on the former
from $1.00 to $0.50 per 100 pounds.4 7 Interstate passenger car-
riers operating between fixed termini and between two or more
municipalities over a route extending 10 miles or less within
Kentucky were required to pay a fee of one-third that paid by
intrastate vehicles.
4K
The annual registration tax for trucks remained the same
from 1926 until 1934, except for the December, 1928, State Tax
Commission order to the county clerks requiring all trucks to be
re-rated for license purposes. By this order each truck from
1.5-ton to 8-ton capacity, except trucks manufactured prior to
1922, which were treated as obsolete, were given an "actual
carrying capacity" in excess of the manufacturer's rated car-
rying capacity. The increase in capacity, according to the
Court of Appeals, 49 averaged almost 50 per cent. The Commis-
sion placed the new construction on the statutes in the belief
that overloaded trucks had a carrying capacity in excess of the
manufacturers' ratings. The language of the motor vehicle acts
beginning in 1918 was clearly ambiguous as to the standard;
and so the Court of Appeals, following the doctrine of con-
temporaneous construction, declared that the State Tax Com-
mision was without any right to require a license tax on actual
carrying capacity without legislative change.50
'Acts 1926, chap. 111, see. 1, p. 357.
' Acts 1926, chap. 112, see. 27, p. 373.47Acts 1930, chap. 75, sec. 1, p. 231.
" Acts 1930, chap. 75, see. 1, p. 232.
" State Tax Commission et al. v. Safety Transfer and Storage Co.
et al., 230 Ky. 225, 18 S.W. (2d) 991 (1929).
"' State Tax Commission et al. v. Safety Transfer and Storage
Co. et al., 230 Ky. 225, 18 S.W. (2d) 991 (1929).
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Truck overs alleged that they were unable to procure li-
cense plates for their vehicles during the depression of the
early 1930's on or before January 1 of each year; as a result
they had no right to operate their vehicles; if they did operate
them, they subjected themselves to the payment of penalties for
operating them without their license plates.5 1 Financial strin-
gency, resulting from both the general economic depression and
the fact that the registration date immediately followed Christ-
mas shopping, may have accounted for some decline-in the num-
ber of registrations.
To relieve this situation, the successive governors52 issued
proclamations extending the time in which they might register
or procure license plates. The last of such proclamations was
that of Governor Laffoon, which extended a grace period to
February 28, 1934, for securing a license. Thousands of truck
owners still did not license their trucks. The average registration
rates were above the average rates imposed by other states.5 3
The automobile clubs of Kentucky demanded a reduction in the
tax on trucks so as to be in line with similar fees exacted in the
states bordering Kentucky. Governor Laffoon asserted that
more uniformity in rates was greatly needed.
54
The annual registration tax for trucks was sharply reduced
by the legislature in 1934 and the new rates made effective im-
mediately. 55 The rates for busses based on vehicle weight were
continued at $0.50 a 100 pounds, but there were drastic reduc-
tions in the upper brackets for the bus tag tax.56 Two years later
legislation was enacted to provide a period of grace.
PRESENT REGISTRATION TAx IN KENTUCKY
All owners or operators of motor vehicles, except those en-
gaged in the transportation of passengers for hire operating
r Martin, Com'r of Revenue v. Louisville Motors, 276 Ky. 696,
125 S.W. 241 (1939). At certain times the statutes have imposed no
penalty for delinquency. 11 REP. KY. STATE TAX COMMISSION
(1928) 5.
'Martin, Com'r of Revenue v. Louisville Motors, 276 Ky. 696,
125 S.W. 241 (1939).
5' JAMES W. MARTIN, AN IMMEDIATE TAX PROGRAM FOR THE STATE
OF KENTUCKY (1934) 6 (Bulletin of the Bureau of Business Research,
University of Kentucky).
"Message of Governor Ruby Laffoon to the General Assembly
(Jan. 8, 1934) 1 KY. SEN. J. 101.
Acts 1934, chap. 102, sec. 1, p. 488.
Acts 1934, chap. 102, sec. 1, p. 488.
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under a certificate of public convenience and necessity, must
register the vehicle with the county clerk of the county in which
the owner resides or in which the vehicle is to be operated. The
owner presents his bill of sale with the application for registra-
tion in the case of a new vehicle; otherwise, by March 1 of
each year he presents his registration receipt for the preceding
year with the new application.5 7 The application for registration
mnst be accompanied by the appropriate fee based upon rated
carrying capacity. Since 1934 the legislature has made changes
in neither the rates nor the base for truck registrations. 58
Farm trucks, school busses, church busses, and trucks on
which well drills have been mounted to the frame are required
to pay only the flat registration fee of $4.50, the same as is re-
quired of passenger cars.5 0 If a farmer desires the regular com-
mercial license for a truck that he previously licensed as a farm
truck, the farm truck plates are taken up and the regular com-
mercial license issued upon payment of the annual commercial
fee less the amount paid for the farm truck license. For ex-
ample, if a 1.5-ton truck, previously licensed as a farm truck,
is changed into a commercial truck, the correct state fee is
$35.50, regardless of the time of year the farmer changes from
the farm to commercial use. However, if a farmer sells a farm
truck, the plates are taken up and the vehicle transferred to the
purchaser. The regular commercial license may then be issued
upon collection of the commercial fee for the remainder of the
year.31'
In Kentueky there is no statutory authority for requiring
a registration tax on trailers or semi-trailers. 0 ' The Court of
Appeals has suggested that the capacity of a truck is actually
reduced by the trailer, because the load is moved a greater
distance from the power plant; and, if a truck and semi-trailer
"' KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES (hereinafter referred to as KRS),
186.020.
The present schedule of rates is shown in Table II.
KRS 186.050.
'Ky. Dept. of Revenue, Regulation RG-3, Aug. 29, 1942.
"'Commonwealth v. Wilborn, 250 Ky. 148, 61 S.W. (2d) 1051
(1933). This case refers to semi-trailers, but the statute is also silent
regarding state trailer registration. Other states disagree with this
view. Only North Dakota and Tennessee provide kindred examples.
In each of these cases, the trailers and semi-trailers become a part
of the truck combination and are included in the gross weight used
to measure truck licenses.
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are considered as a unit, the capacity of the truck is not in-
creased by the attachment of a semi-trailer.
62
Although there exists no statutory authority for the Com-
monwealth of Kentucky to require semi-trailers and trailers to
obtain registration plates, cities may, by ordinance, impose li-
cense taxes on semi-trailers and trailers and require that regis-
tration plates issued as evidence of the licensing be affixed to
the vehicle in some conspicuous place,0 3 except that no city
may impose a license fee or tax on any motor vehicle operating
under a certificate of public convenience and necessity or a con-
tract carrier's permit.
64
Motor vehicles owned exclusively by county, city, state, or
federal government are- registered without charge upon re-
ceipt of a certified statement of ownership from the govern-
mental unit that owns the vehicle.65 However, in cases in which
the title to a publicly used vehicle is in an individual's name a
license should be purchased from the county clerk and a fee
paid according to the class of the vehicle. 0 Such exemption,
however, does not affect the duty of a county, municipality,
or the federal government to comply with regulations relating
to the operation of motor vehicles. 6
The evolution of the dealers' license, a minor source of
revenue, has been long and intricate. At present, all states treat
demonstrators differently from vehicles otherwise owned and
operated. Kentucky and 45 other statess impose a substantial
flat rate for a specified number of plates, ranging from one to
six sets, and an additional charge, which is ordinarily less than
the charge for the first set, for each added set of plates. In
some states the tax payable is computed according to the type
' Commonwealth v. Wilborn, 250 Ky. 148, 61 S.W. (2d) 1051
(1933).
'KRS 186.270. This section was declared valid in Ashland
Transfer Co. et al. v. State Tax Commission et al., 247 Ky. 144, 56
S.W. (2d) 691 (1932).
"' KRS 281.570. In City of Pineville v. Meeks, 254 Ky. 167, 71
S.W. (2d) 33 (1934) it was charged that the Acts 1932, chap. 104,
art. 4, sec. 11, p. 529 (KRS 281.570) and Acts 1932, chap. 106, sec. 13
(b), p. 542 (KRS 186.270) were in "irreconcilable conflict"; but, the
Court ruled that, if considered together, as in the test, no such con-
flict exists.
KRS 186.060.
0 Ky. Dept. of Revenue, Regulation RG-17, May 26, 1942.
"'Cf. State v. Preston, 103 Ore. 631, 206 Pac. 304 (1922).
Only Delaware, Florida, and New Jersey do not conform with
this practice.
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of the vehicle; for example, Colorado exacts a higher fee from
a dealer in trucks than a dealer in passenger cars. Each manu-
facturer of, or dealer in, motor vehicles in Kentucky is re-
quired to register with the county clerk of the county in which
his principal place of business, or any branch, sub-agent, or
agency is located. The annual registration fee is $25 for the
first dealer's plate, $1.00 each for 5 additional plates, $3.00
each for the next 5 additional plates, and $5.00 per plate for
those in excess of the first 11.69 No person may use any dealers'
plates for any purpose other than demonstration for sale.
If a licensed dealer desires to transport motor vehicles not
registered as demonstrators, he secures "in transit" plates
upon depositing $1.00 per plate with the county clerk and pay-
ing a fee of $0.10 per plate. If the "in transit" plates are re-
turned to the county clerk within 15 days, the deposit is
refunded. If the plates are not returned within 15 days, the
deposit is forfeited and becomes a part of the State Road
Fund.
7"
If any licensed motor vehicle is destroyed by fire or acci-
dent, the owner, on presentation of the required evidence, is
entitled to a refund of a part of the license fee proportionate to
the unexpired fraction of the calendar year.71 Before the De-
partment of Revenue requisitions such refunds, the Department
c.f Highways must approve.
7 2-
States employ at least five general methods of treating late
reoistrants other than delinquents: (1) no reduction in rate,
(2) one reduction at some time during the registration period,
(3) two reductions during the year, (4) quarterly reductions,
and (5) monthly reductions. The first named methods make
for administrative simplicity. The last named three are at-
tempts to approximate taxation justice. The trend in recent
years has been toward elimination of nongraduated reductions.
In 1924, 26 states permitted only one nongraduated percentage
reduction for registration covering less than a full year; in
1927 the number had declined to 20 states; and by 1931 only
15 states allowed one flat reduction.7 3 Kentucky and Missis-
" KRS 186.070.
KRS 186.080.
4 KRS 186.120.
.2 Ky. Dept. of Revenue, Regulation RG-15, April 28, 1942.
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, TAXATION OF MOTOR
VEHICLE TRANSPORTATION (1932) 60.
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sippi were the only states which in 1924 provided for propor-
tional monthly reductions. Only five states74 other than
Kentucky now provide for them. 75
Kentucky in 1914 made the registration year coterminous
with the calendar year.7 6 Since 1914 no change has been made.
In 26 states77 the registration period is coterminous with the
calendar year; in 10 states75 and the District of Columbia the
year closes Mlarch 31; in 3 states79 it closes February 28; in the
remainder it ends at varying times.80 There has been a recent
tendency to change the period from the calendar year to a
period beginning on April 1.81 The latter date is deemed more
favorable to motorists because it does not immediately fol-
low Christmas holidays.
Only 19 states, all of which except New York and Cali-
fornia are largely rural, extend days of grace. Only three states
extend days of grace after March 1.82 Kentucky allows the
calendar days to March 1 as days of grace.8 3  Idaho and South
Dakota allow the calendar days prior to March 31; New
Mexico extends the days of grace to M2\arch 2. Among the alleged
reasons for allowing days of grace are the following: (a) dif-
ficulty of travel due to weather conditions on poor roads
resulting in failure to register until early spring, (b) reduced
buying power following Christmas holidays, and (c) the rush
of late licensing near the end of the calendar year.
' 4Iowa, La., Miss., Tex., Wis.
NATIONAL HIGHWAY USERS CONFERENCE, REGISTRATION FEES AND
SPECIAL TAXES (1942) 8, 9.
"Acts 1914, chap. 69, p. 180.
'Ariz., Calif., Colo., Fla., Idaho, Ill., Iowa, Kan., Ky., La., Me.,
Mass., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N. M., N. Y., N. C., N. D., Okla.,
Ore., S. D., Utah, Wash., Wyo.
Md., N. H., N. J., Ohio, Pa., R. I., Tenn., Tex., Vt., Va.
Conn., Ind., Mich.
* NATIONAL HIGHWAY USERS CONFERENCE, loc. cit. supra.
a This is shown by the fact that the District of Columbia and 10
states now provide for a registration year beginning April 1, but no
state in 1931 provided for a registration year beginning April 1.
2 NATIONAL HIGHWAY USERS CONFERENCE, loc. cit. supra.
"Acts 1936, chap. 67, p. 197; Martin, Com'r of Revenue v. Louis-
ville Motors, 276 Ky. 696, 125 S. W. (2d) 241 (1937).
II
As the use of motor vehicles developed there was increased
public demand to "get Kentucky out of the mud." Also, the
use of motor vehicles for the transportation of persons and
property constituted a new business in direct competition with
the steam railroads of the state. As a consequence, there was a
growing demand for increased taxation to provide road main-
tenance and to place motor carriers in the same competitive
position as the railroads.
8 4
EAARLY CARRIER TAx LEGISLATION
The carrier legislation of 192485 was the first in Kentucky
imposing a tax for the privilege of using the highways for
commercial bus transportation. Its two-fold object was (a) to
provide regulation for'protection of the public and (b) to se-
cure additional revenue from the carriers as support for in-
creased maintenance of roads made necessary by wear resulting
from the operation of common carrier vehicles. The act required
each motor transportation company to secure from the State
Highway Commission a certificate of public convenience and
necessity conditioned upon conformity with certain require-
ments and regulations designed to protect passengers. It also
subjected each carrier, in addition to the graduated registration
tax, to a special carrier excise ranging from $2.50 a passenger
seat for vehicles carrying 5 passengers or less to $15 a seat for
vehicles carrying more than 30 passengers.
The 1924 act furnished a new source of litigation for Ken-
tucky motorists. According to the prevailing view, the state in
' The State Efficiency Commission on February 11, 1924, laid
before Governor Fields a plan to raise an additional $2,000,000 an-
nually for the road fund by enacting a temporary tax on motor
vehicle use of the highways (Courier-Journal, Feb. 11, 1924, p. 1,
c. 6). A minimum registration tax of $25 for trucks of 1-ton capa-
city and $50 for each additional ton capacity was also recommended
in lieu of the prevailing rates in order to make these vehicles contrib-
ute their share toward road maintenance. At the same time many
enthusiastic highway users proposed a $75,000,000 bond issue to be
used principally for roads (Id., Jan. 25, 1924, p. 1; 2 EFFICIENCY
COMMISSION OF KENTUCKY, op. cit. 594, 595). The Efficiency Com-
mission supported the pay-as-you-go plan along with changes in the
motor carrier fees and gasoline taxes.
,'Acts 1924, chap. 81, p. 204.
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the exercise of its police powers could not only condition and
regulate the use of the highways, but could exclude common
carriers.80 This rule rests in part on the circumstance that the
public carrier for hire uses the highways as the chief place of
a private business. Such use is an extraordinary and privileged
use,8 7 and there exists no inherent right to operate motor ve-
hicles as common carriers for hire on city streets or other
highways of the state.88
"If the state determines that the use of the streets for private
purposes in the usual and ordinary manner shall be preferred
over their use by common carriers for hire there is nothing in the
Fourteenth Amendment to prevent. The streets belong to the
public and are primarily for the use of the public in the ordinary
way. Their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordi-
nary, and, generally at least, may be prohibited or conditioned
as the legislature deems proper."'
The provision of the 1924 statute requiring auto transpor-
tation companies to obtain a certificate of public convenience
and necessity was assailed in the courts as being class legislation
in that it denied to certain people the use of the highways unless
they secured a certificate, and that it tended to create a mo-
nopoly.90 The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in keeping with the
established principle, sustained the act regulating and taxing
auto transportation companies as a proper exercise of right of
1 This rule had been elaborated in the cases of Shoenfield v.
Seattle, 265 Fed. 726 (1920); Giglio v. Barrett et al., City Com'rs, 207
Ala. 278, 92 So. 668 (1922); Dresser et al. v. City of Wichita et al.,
96 Kan. 320, 153 Pac. 1194; Fritz et al. v. Bresbrey et al., 44 R. I. 207,
116 Atl. 419 (1922); J. E. Sheets Taxicab Co. v. Commonwealth, 140
Va. 325, 125 S. E. 431 (1924); Gruber v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 312,
125 S.E. 427 (1924); Hadfield et al. v. Ludin, Pros. Atty., 98 Wash.
657, 168 Pac. 516 (1917); Ex parte Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781
(1915).
" John C. Worsham, The Motor Bus and the Law (1927) PROC.
KY. BAR Ass'N 79, 83.
SReo Bus Line Co. v. Southern Bus Line, 209 Ky. 40, 272 S.W.
18 (1925); Slusher v. Safety Coach Transit Co., 229 Ky. 731, 17 S.W.
(2d) 1012 (1929); Consolidated Coach Corporation v. Kentucky River
Coach Co. et al., 249 Ky. 65, 60 S.W. (2d) 127 (1933); Packard v.
Banton et al., 264 U. S. 140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257 (1924); Stephen et al. v.
Binford et al., 287 U. S. 251, 53 Sup. Ct. 181 (1932); Hester et al. v.
Arkansas Railroad Commission, 172 Ark. 90, 287 S.W. 763 (1926);
State ex rel. Pennington v. Quigg, Chief of Police of Miami, 94 Fla.
1056, 114 So. 859 (1927).
"Packard v. Banton as District Attorney in and for the County
of New York et al., 264 U. S. 140, 144, 44 Sup. Ct. 257 (1924).
' Reo Bus Line Co. v. Southern Bus Line, 209 Ky. 40, 272 S.W. 18
(1925).
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control and not unconstitutional as tending to create a mo-
nopoly.- 1
Carriers operating passenger vehicles for hire paid the
taxes provided in the 1924 legislation in addition to the regis-
tration rates prescribed only for trucks until 1926. In the latter
year, carriers operating passenger vehicles for hire between
fixed termini were classified separately from all others, and the
latter taxed at $1.50 a passenger seat. Passenger transporters
operating vehicles over regular routes were taxed at a flat rate
based on vehicle weight and two variable rates based on the
number of seats.2 For the purpose of correcting administra-
tive weaknesses, the legislation of 1926 created the independent
office of the Commissioner of Motor Transportation 93 to ad-
minister the motor carrier taxes and regulations.
The 1930 session of the General Assembly enacted only
minor revisions influencing the course of motor transportation
tax history. However, a provision was incorporated which re-
lieved the common carrier of two-thirds of the seat tax if the
vehicles operated intercity in interstate commerce and the
route extended ten miles or less within the state.94
Prior to 1932 there were certain developments in the law,
which may well have influenced the legislation of that year.
Therefore, before continuing with the story of the Kentucky
developments as such, it may be well to consider the constitu-
tional limitations under which legislation was enacted. Un-
doubtedly the interstate commerce clause of the federal
Constitution occasioned more controversy than any other con-
stitutional provision. The issue was raised because the owner of
a vehicle operating in interstate commerce may be called on to
pay registration license or, in the case of carriers for hire,
both license and transportation tax in each state in which it
operates. At an early date the issue was disposed of so far as
the registration tax was concerned, 95 and the fundamentals of
" Reo Bus Line Co. v. Southern Bus Line, 209 Ky. 40, 272 S.W. 18
(1925); see also 6 R.C.L. 224-228.
'Acts 1926, chap. 112, sec. 27, p. 372.
" Acts 1926, chap. 112, sec. 36, p. 377.
' Acts 1930, chap. 75, sec. 1, p. 229, 231.
r' Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 622, 35 Sup. Ct.
140 (1914).
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the Supreme Court's finding in that original case have been
repeated often.96
It was not, however, until 1927 that the United States Su-
preme Court decided a case expressly involving a special carrier
tax. In Clark et al. v. Poor et al.,97 which was decided after
motor transportation had begun its period of rapid growth,",
the Supreme Court sustained the Ohio Motor Transportation
Act 99 imposing a tax additional to the registration license ap-
plied to interstate common carrier trucks on the basis of manu-
facturer's rated carrying capacity. Although the taxpayer
operated in interstate commerce, the Court held that he was
subject to police regulation and to the obligation to pay a rea-
sonable tax in compensation for use of the state's roads. Re-
iterating the same doctrine, the Court also held in another
case' 00 that the state, in the absence of actual discrimination,
may tax interstate carriers by a method different from that
applied to intrastate carriers.
Before the Kentucky General Assembly of 1932 convened,
the Supreme Court held that two measures were unconstitu-
tional; one on the ground that there was no connection between
the municipal ordinance seeking to impose the tax and either a
plan of regulation or the carrier's use of the highway, t  and
the other on the ground that the State of Tennessee in pro-
viding a tax on interstate carriers had given no positive
indication that it was an excise for the use of the roads.
0 2
Thus, when the 1932 General Assembly of Kentucky con-
vened, the lawmakers were apprised of the constitutional
'Northern Kentucky Transportation Co. v. City of Bellevue,
215 Ky. 514, 285 S.W. 241 (1926); Kane v. State of New Jersey, 242
U. S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30 (1916); Michigan Public Utilities Commission
et al. v. Duke, doing business as Duke Cartage Co., 266 U. S. 570, 45
Sup. Ct. 191 (1925); Liberty Highway Co. et al. v. Michigan Public
Utilities Commission et al., 294 Fed. 703 (1923); Red Ball Transit Co.
v. Marshall et al., Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 8 Fed. (2d)
635 (1925); Cannon Ball Transportation Co. v. Public Utilities Com-
mission, 113 Ohio 565, 149 N.E. 713 (1925).
w 274 U. S. 354, 47 Sup. Ct. 702 (1927); see also Roswell Magill,
Taxation of Property and Business as Affected by the Commerce
Clause (1932) PROc. NAT. TAX Ass'N 242.
98U. S. DEPT. OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES (1930) 385.
1 OHIO GENERAL CODE (Page's Anno., 1926), sec. 614-696.
'o' Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett et al., 276 U. S. 245,
48 Sup. Ct. 230 (1928).
'Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 48 Sup. Ct. 502 (1928).
" Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, County Court Clerk, 283
U. S. 183, 51 Sup. Ct. 380 (1931).
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possibilities of motor carrier taxation so far as the commerce
clause of the Constitution was concerned. In brief, the state was
at liberty to impose on motor transportation for hire a reason-
able tax additional to the registration license as compensation
for the cost of regulation and for the use of the roads, provided
the purposes were clearly and positively set out in the legisla-
tion by the nature of the tax itself, by the use of the proceeds,
or otherwise. 10 3 It was not at liberty to tax interstate carriers
under a general excise unless one or both of these purposes
were clearly apparent.
DEPRESSION LEGISLATION
Governor Ruby Laffoon, predicating his arguments on the
destruction of the roads and the increased maintenance and
policing problems as well as the unfairness of motor truck
competition with other carriers, 10 4 made bus and carrier truck
regulation and taxation a major policy of his administration.
In 1932 a bill 1° 5 providing for a mileage excise was proposed
in the legislature despite the opposition of farmers, 0 the pub-
lie carriers,'" 7 and the Motor Truck Club of Kentucky.'"° The
measure was apparently not offered primarily as a revenue
device but as a protection to the railroads against unfair bus
and truck conipetition.' 0 9 This bill not only provided for cer-
tificates for common carriers of both passengers and property
and permits for all contract carriers, but it also prescribed
high-rate fees and taxes to be paid by every road carrier for
hire.
While the bill was pending before the General Assembly of
1932, it was questioned on the ground that it might be incon-
" Id. at 185.
Message of Governor Ruby Laffoon to the General Assembly
(Jan. 12, 1932) 1 Ky. SEN. J. 34.
" The bill was reportedly introduced at the instance of railroad
interests. Courier-Journal, Jan. 24, 1932, sec. 1, p. 4, c. 1. Cf.
R. W. Keenon, Bus and Automobile Law (1932) PRoc. Ky. BAR Ass'N
181. One eminent railroad attorney expresses the opinion that the
bill was not introduced "at the demand of large railroad interests."
Letter from J. H. McChord, L. & N. R. R. Co., Aug. 19, 1944.
"'Courier-Journal, Feb. 14, 1932, sec. 1, p. 8, c. 3; id. Jan. 29,
1932, sec. 1, p. 1, c. 5.
.' Id. Jan. 29, 1932, sec. 1, p. 8, c. 5.
Id. Oct. 12, 1932, sec. 1, p. 1, c. 2.
' Id. March 15, 1932, p. 1; Message of Governor Ruby Laffoon to
the General Assembly, loc. cit. supra. Mr. J. H. McChord, General
Solicitor of the L. & N., believes the purpose was not protection of the
railroads' competitive position. Letter, Aug. 19, 1944.
KENTUCKY LAv JOURNAL
sistent with the Federal Aid Road Law in that it placed a toll
on the use of the highways." 0 However, the same question had
previously been decided in the case of Johnson Transfer and
Freight Lines et al. v. Perry et al."' in which the court held
that such provisions did not invalidate similar statutory re-
quirements.
In the legislation as enacted in 1932 after a famous po-
litical controversy, passenger carriers were required to pay, in
addition to the registration tax and a seating-capacity fee rang-
ing from $10 a vehicle for small busses to $25 a vehicle for
large ones, an excise for the use of the highways ranging from
*0.0025 a vehicle mile in the case of vehicles with a seating
capacity of 7 persons or less to $0.03 a vehicle mile for busses
seating 30 persons or more. Similarly, property carriers for
hire were required to pay, in addition to special fees and regu-
lar registration taxes, excises for the use of the highway rang-
ing upward from $0.005 a vehicle mile for trucks weighing un-
laden 5,500 to 6,000 pounds. Larger trucks than those of 6,000
pounds unladen weight were subject to an additional $0.005 a
vehicle mile for each ton or fraction of a ton. The maximum
tax rate of $0.035 a vehicle mile was fixed by the comparatively
severe top weight restriction to 9 tons. In case of either pas-
senger or freight vehicles, the act provided that the rates should
be doubled if the carrier did not pay the registration tax be-
cause he was engaged in interstate commerce. It was also pro-
vided that a differential rate should apply if the vehicle were
not equipped throughout with pneumatic rubber tires. 1 22
Courier-Journal, March 12, 1932, p. 1.
"47 Fed. (2d) 900 (1931).
Acts 1932, chap. 104, sec. 10, p. 528. One question incident to
the validity of taxation and regulation of common and contract car-
riers in the same legislation had been previously considered, and it
had been held [Michigan Public Utilities Commission et al. v. Duke,
doing business as Duke Cartage Co., 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct. 191
(1925); Frost and Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission of Cali-
fornia, 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605 (1926); Smith v. Cahoon, 283
U. S. 553, 51 Sup. Ct. 583 (1931)] that the legislature could not by
fiat constitute private carriers hauling under contract common
carriers. Very shortly after the Kentucky law was enacted, how-
ever, the Supreme Court upheld legislation to impose special taxes on
contract carriers and to provide regulation appropriate to their
status [Stephenson et al. v. Binford 6t al., 287 U. S. 251, 53 Sup. Ct.
181 (1932); Sproles et al. v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 52 Sup. Ct. 581
(1932); Continental Baking Company v. Woodring, Governor et al.,
286 U. S. 352, 52 Sup. Ct. 595 (1932)]. When the Kentucky act was
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In the 1932 act, due largely to Farm Bureau pressure, the
General Assembly provided for exemption of trucks weighing
5,500 pounds or less.1 3 This exemption was enacted despite
the opposition of truck lines whose representatives contended
that the tax-free vehicles would unfairly compete with heavy,
highly taxed, and severely regulated vehicles. The General As-
sembly of 1934 sought to repeal the exemption" 4 and to enact
a provision which would exempt only vehicles hauling farm
products. However, the Court of Appeals found the new en-
actment so arbitrary as to be unconstitutional, 1  and, in ac-
cordance with the statute, reinstated the 1932 provision.
The motor transportation tax plan of 1932 remained intact
until 1938 and partly so for a period of 10 years. TMeantime,
certain constitutional law problems were clarified. Several cases
re-emphasized the right of the states to impose excises for the
enforcement of regulations and for the use of the roads,
whether o1 the basis of gross ton-mileage" 6 or a flat charge
per vehicle." 7 It was also found"" that the fact that a par-
ticular user of the highways got less value from that use than
did his competitors was irrelevant to the question of constitu-
tionality. At page 289 of the United States Reporter, the Court
stated that "One who receives a privilege without limit is not
wronged by his own refusal to enjoy it as freely as he may."
Although the fact is olly incidentally significant for under-
standing of Kentuck- legislation, the Supreme Court also
sustained reasonable taxes on the use of the roads for the
transportation for hire of motor vehicles in caravans." 9
questioned, therefore, the District Court could only follow the pre-
vious ruling [Baker v. Glenn et al., State Tax Commission, 2 Fed.
Supp. 880 (1933)].
' Ths exemption was upheld in Baker v. Glenn et al., State Tax
Commission, 2 Fed. Supp. 880 (1933).
"' Acts 1934, chap. 103, sec. 3, p. 493.
1 Priest et al. v. State Tax Commission et al., 258 Ky. 391,
80 S.W. (2d) 43 (1935).
"' Continental Baking Co. et al. v. Woodring, Governor et al., 286
U. S. 352, 52 Sup. Ct. 595 (1932).
" Aero Mayflower Transit Co. et al. v. Georgia Public Service
Commission et al., 295 U. S. 285, 55 Sup. Ct. 709 (1935).
" Id.
"' Morf v. Bingaman, Commissioner of Revenue for New Mexico,
298 U. S. 407, 56 Sup. Ct. 756 (1936); Clark, Director of the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles et al. v. Paul Gray, Inc. et al., 306 U. S. 583,
59 Sup. Ct. 744 (1939). Cf. also Geo. B. Wallace, Inc. et al.
v. Pfost, State Commissioner of Law Enforcement, 57 Idaho 279,
65 P. (2d) 725 (1937).
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Due partly to the unusually high rates, partly to the se-
vere regulations, and partly to other factors, administration of
the mileage tax on trucks for hire proved to be exceedingly
difficult. Although the commonwealth's agents succeeded in
apprehending many delinquents, it was common knowledge that
the measure was inadequately enforced. MIoreover, under exist-
ing conditions, it appeared impracticable to secure reasonably
complete administration without exorbitant cost. -1o So the
General Assembly of 1938 repealed the 1932 mileage tax on
trucks for hire and substituted 12 1 an excise of $1.00 a hundred
pounds net weight. A penalty of 50 per cent for use of equip-
ment with other than pneumatic tires throughout was provided,
even though the need for such a provision had been largely
eliminated by considerations of transportation efficiency.
The same General Assembly enacted a measure providing
for a tax on busses' 2 2 of one-thirty-sixth cent a seat-mile plus
an annual tax of $8.00 a seat up to 16 seats, $15 a seat for the
next 8 seats, and $25 a seat for each seat over 24.123 Busses
operating primarily within municipalities were to pay in lieu
of both these excises a flat rate of $1.50 a seat. The same rate
was also made applicable to taxicabs and U-drive-its.
2 4
PRESENT KENTUCKY MOTOR TRANSPORTATION TAXES As
APPLIED To TRUCKS
The Kentucky legislature in 1942 enacted a new motor
transportation statute, 2 5 which provides a weight tax on
trucks operated by common carriers and contract carriers, a
tax on casual or occasional trips, a mileage and a tag-seat tax
on passenger vehicles operated by common carriers and con-
tract carriers, and a seat tax on U-drive-its.
The 1938 annual tax of $1.00 a hundred pounds of the net
weight of property carriers for hire, in addition to the regular
registration fee based on capacity, was continued. Payment of
'These were the observations of the Commissioner of Revenue,
James W. Martin. It is interesting that the tax yield under the new
plan continued to increase after a period of administrative readjust-
ment.
'Acts 1938, chap. 171, sec. 1, p. 775.
2 Acts 1938, chap. 48, sec. 2, p. 293.
1 A "seat" for this purpose did not include collapsible aisle seats.
Id. sec. 1, subsec. (d).
12 Id. sec. 3, p. 294.
'Acts 1942, chap. 185, p. 827; KRS 281.480-281.570.
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the tax is due by January 1, and the proceeds are credited to
the State Road Fund. 20 With the exception of Nevada no other
state employs a similar rate schedule of special fees for prop-
erty carriers for hire based on net weight.
27
Common carriers of property operating under a certificate
of public convenience and necessity not entering the state a
distance of over 15 miles are not subject to the weight tax.
1 28
Annual registration with the division of motor transportation,
however, is required in order that officials may enforce regu-
latory statutes. This provision seeks to relieve the multiplicity
of taxes on interstate commerce. 129 The tax on transient truck
operations would not discriminate against out-of-state carriers,
but would add to the load on those which barely entered the
state. It has been suggested1 30 that further extensions of the
same policy would promote trade mobility-and hence trade
volume. Continuation of the provision for a 50 per cent higher
rate for vehicles not equipped entirely with pneumatic tires is
largely a dead letter for non-taxation reasons.' 3' The 1942 act
makes special provision for those operators that make only
casual or occasional trips into Kentucky incident to transpor-
tation for hire. Each operator of vehicles engaged in transpor-
tation of property for hire making occasional trips into Ken-
tueky pays an excise tax of $2.50 for each trip into the state.132
' 'KRS 47.010.C7 f. NATIONAL HIGHWAY USERS CONFERENCE, op. cit. supra 13 ff.
' KRS 281.480.
L2, This legislation came largely as a result of the complaints to
federal agencies during 1940-41 regarding Kentucky obstructions to
interstate commerce.
'A. H. Martin, Highway Barriers and National Defense, 5 INTER-
STATE TRADE BARRIERS (1942) 49-65 (U. S. Dept. of Commerce,
Marketing Laws Survey).
" U. S. Bureau of Public Roads, Motor Truck Impact as Af-
fected by Tires, Other Truck Factors, and Road Roughness (1926) 7
PUBLIC ROADS 69 and Motor Truck Impact as Affected by Rubber
Tread Thickness of Tires (1930) 11 PUBLIC ROADS 133; G. M.
Sprowles, Fifteen to Fifty Per Cent Saving on Tires (1932) PROCEED-
INGs, AMERICAN ROAD BUILDERS ASS'N 50.
L'S KRS 281.510. Only a few states permit a limited number of
trips by out-of-state trucks without payment of the regular fees or
of a fraction thereof. Frequently, however, such permission is ex-
tended to only a limited type of truck operator. For example, the
Arizona law extends the privilege of special 30-, 60-, or 90-day
permits only to private truckers transporting their own property
upon payment of 0.1, 0.2, or 0.3 of the annual registration fees. Ala-
bama will issue special trip permits only to carriers transporting
their own property or to those transporting property for others to a
destination within the state and not operating over regular routes.
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The 1942 act continued earlier exemption of property car-
riers and added others. Exemptions now include: (a) trucks
used only by a non-profit cooperative association or its mem-
hers if the vehicle is owned or leased exclusively by the associa-
tion; (b) vehicles used exclusively for the transportation of
agricultural and dairy products from the farm, market, gin,
warehouse, dairy, or mill, regardless of the ownership of the
vehicle, if the title to the goods transported invariably remains
in the producer;133 (c) trucks engaged exclusively in hauling
material and supplies used in the construction of highways;
(d) motor vehicles used for the transportation of property for
hire, if operating exclusively within the limits of a city or
within its suburban area.'3 4
PRESENT MVOTOR TRANSPORTATION TAxES APPLIED To
PASSENdER CARRIERS
The rates of the mileage and tag-seat taxes on contract and
common carriers of passengers were continued without altera-
tion except as applied to casual operators and exempted
vehicles. The law requires each passenger carrier to pay a mile-
age excise tax equal to one-thirty-sixth cent for each regular
' "Producer" as used in this act includes the landlord.
'KRS 281.020. The exemption of trucks engaged exclusively
in hauling materials and supplies for highway construction is a new
exemption for Kentucky, but exists in similar form in various states.
Five states (Ark., Mo., Nev., Ohio, and S. D.), in addition to Ken-
tucky, provide specifically that contractors engaged in public road
work need not comply with special carrier taxes. Pennsylvania
exempts dump trucks transporting road construction material and
all trucks transporting ashes or excavated rubbish. Mississippi
exempts from carrier taxes those vehicles used exclusively to deliver
gravel or unmanufactured road material. The other three exemp-
tions have prevailed in Kentucky for several years and are usual in
other states. The agricultural producers usually are required to be
transporting their own livestock or farm products from the point of
production to market or transporting supplies on the return trip
before the states allow the exemption. Maryland exempts only
vehicles transporting milk to cooling stations or freight platforms.
Georgia exempts vehicles exclusively transporting farm products
between points not having railroad facilities in case the load trans-
ported does not exceed 1.5 tons. Furthermore, Georgia exempts
vehicles that transport agricultural, dairy, or forest products exclu-
sively between the farm, market, gin, warehouse, or mill if the load
does not exceed 18,550 pounds, provided the title remains with the
producer at the time the commodities are hauled. Minnesota and
Washington extend the exemption further to farmers occasionally
and infrequently transporting for hire. Tennessee exempts vehicles
used solely to transport milk products from the producer to the pur-
chaser, or infrequent transportation of livestock and perishable farm
products to the market by the owner.
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seat 135 multiplied by the total number of miles traveled plus a
tag tax of $8.00 on each seat for the first 16 seats, $15 for each
of the next 8 seats, and $25 for each remaining seat.13 The
tag-seat tax is paid annually in advance on or before January
1; whereas the mileage tax is payable on or before the fifteenth
day of each month. 137 The proceeds are given to the State Road
Fund for road expenditures. 138 On surrender of the license
tag and proof that the vehicle will not be used on the highways
due to destruction by fire, sale, or transfer, the division of
motor transportation will give credit for the unearned por-
tion of the license fees for another vehicle which is to be put
into service in that year. In no event are cash refunds made.
In order to ascertain correctly the mileage traveled by motor
vehicles, the division is given authority to prescribe the records
and character of appliances necessary to establish the correct
mileage of each operator.' 9 The law provides penalties for
violations.'
4"
The use of vehicles operating under a certificate of con-
venience and necessity, on account of which owners pay the
mileage and the tag-seat taxes, is exempt from registration
and usage taxes. 141 Such carriers operating under either cer-
tificates or permits are also exempt from any city license fee.
If a passenger carrier for hire begins operation after January
I in any year, he is then required to pay only a proportionate
part of the annual tag-seat tax for the remainder of the year.
Other exemptions from the mileage and tag-seat tax which
apply to passenger carriers are provided as follows: (a) motor
vehicles used as school busses, (b) church busses operated under
" "Regular seat" means a seat ordinarily used by one passenger,
but does not include folding or collapsible emergency aisle seats,
provided the number of such emergency seats shall not be greater
than 25 per cent of the regular seats. KRS 281.520.
1" KRS 281.520.
1''KRS 281.540. The percentage penalties provided in 1938 for
failure to pay the tax when due are omitted in KRS 281.550, but
appear in Acts 1942, chap. 185, p. 863. There seems to be no author-
ity for this omission.
' KRS 47.010.
KRS 281.550.
'4 'KRS 281.990.
14 KRS 186.020 and KRS 138.470. Previous to 1942 this exemp-
tion included all passenger vehicles for hire, rather than merely
those operating under certificates. Reeves, Com'r of Revenue et al.
v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 291 Ky. 226, 163 S.W. (2d) 482 (1942);
Reeves, Com'r of Revenue, etc. v. Louisville Railway Co., 291 Ky.
200, 163 S.W. (2d) 485 (1942).
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the direction of church authorities, (c) vehicles used for the
exclusive transportation of members of the armed forces on
educational or recreational trips under the direction of military
authorities. The last exclusion is limited, however, to the dura-
tion of the present national emergency.
142
Taxicabs, city busses, U-drive-its, 143 and vehicles operat-
ing under certificates in interstate commerce, but not entering
the state more than 10 miles from the point of entry, are ex-
empt from the mileage and tag taxes, but pay a tax of $1.50 a
regular seat instead.' 44 Also effective on October 1, 1942, was
legislation requiring casual or occasional operators of passenger
vehicles for hire to pay the flat $5.00 registration fee to the
division and the mileage tax required of regular carriers. How-
ever, if such vehicles are leased to, or operated by, any carrier
holding a certificate authorizing him to operate routes in this
state, double mileage tax is required to be paid.1
45
2 KRS 281.020.
' As used in this section, a "U-drive-it" means a motor vehicle
for hire for the transportation of persons, for which no driver is
furnished.
"KRS 281.520.
a4-KRS 281.510.
